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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,

]
)
]

KENT WILLIAM BLANCHARD,

]

Defendant / Appellant.

)

Case No. 980044-CA

V.

NOTICE OF ERRATA
COMES NOW Defendant / Appellant, Kent William Blanchard, by and through
counsel, Scott L Wiggins, of and for Arnold & Wiggins, P.C, and files this Notice of
Errata in the Brief of Appellant previously filed with this Court on October 23, 1998. In
the course of preparing Statement of Fact No. 7 as contained in the Statement of Facts
section of the Brief of Appellant, Counsel for Defendant / Appellant inadvertently left out
lines 5 and 6 of page 191 of the Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, which

contains an additional objection of Defendant to the imposition, amount, and distribution
'?

l;irt

KM>

ui

Statement of Fact No. ? is as follows:
DEFENDANT:

'Cause I figure I owe him about $500. Chat was stated
in the original phone conversation.
of the Brief of Appellant, for purposes

Th

of accuracy, should read as follows:
7.
In the course of the discussion between the trial court and
counsel as well as Defendant about the amount of restitution, the following
exchange took place:
Well, let me tell you that I would probably order
THE COURT:
a restitution in this case, in that if it wants to be
different from that or argued, I would argue that
restitution of the $1,821 for the three checks,
less an offset for the last payroll check that he's
due. So it would the five hundred ~ what is it,
thirty-one?
Seventeen.
DEFENDANT.
So it would 1,821 minus $517. So it would be
THE COURT:
$1,304.
MR. HARWARD: Yes.
MR. ALBRIGHT: Your honor, the victim here, Paul Howard, gave
an itemized statement to the Court, and it
totaled $1,300. The $600 out of the $1,821 that
you've mentioned was actually given for topsoil
or it went toward topsoil, was paid off, as I
understood.
Well, my understanding is that he got a check
THE HUH IT
for that topsoil already. This is money that he
received from Mrs. Crimins for this job, went
2

in, and should have been paid to Landscape
Express. I mean, I believe that the Court -Do
MR. ALBRIGHT: you want to have a hearing, or do we want
to it — I mean.
MR. HARWARD:I think that's better the way the Court did it.
MR. ALBRIGHT:The $1,821 minus —
MR. HARWARD:With an offset for the —
THE COURT: Last week's wages.
MR. HARWARD:And then both parties need to be advised, this
doesn't affect any civil claim one way —
Anything
for overtime or any of that stuff will
THE COURT:
have to be dealt with separately.
MR. ALBRIGHT:You can still sue.
DEFENDANT: Not from incarceration you can't.
MR. ALBRIGHT:You need to let the Court know if you feel
comfortable —
Your order then, would actually be for ~
DEFENDANT: 'Cause I it should be — he should not be entitled
to earn a profit on the side jobs where I did all
the labor myself. If he's only out thirteen
hundred and something dollars in materials and
labor, as you're claiming, then my $500 should
be subtracted from that and difference should be
paid to him.
MR. ALBRIGHT: I wonder if we could ask him —
'Cause I figure I owe him about $500. That was
DEFENDANT:
stated in the original phone conversation.
THE COURT:
Well, if he's willing to accept that, I mean —
MR. ALBRIGHT: Why don't we find out from Mr. Howard if he's
willing to accept the -- it would actually take it
down to about $800 and something, the thirteen
that he asked for minus —
It would be, what, $1,369?
THE COURT:
MR. ALBRIGHT: $1,369.

3

MR. HARWARD: In the context of restitution in a criminal case,
he would accept a restitution order for the
amount, the $1,300 that he -THE COURT: $1,369.
MR. HARWARD:~ less the —
THE COURT: $517.
MR. HARWARD:Yes. However, here's something he's going —
the tools and things that you're holding for
collateral, he wants to know if he can get
permission, some way of getting recovery the ~
DEFENDANT: I have a $30 trailer hitch, but its locked in the
back of a storage unit, so .. .
MR. HARWARD:Okay. If I could —
DEFENDANT: I could send him a check for 30 bucks
sometime.
MR. ALBRIGHT:Do you want to add 30 onto ~
MR. HARWARD:Can we add that on?
MR. ALBRIGHT: You keep the hitch.
MR. HARWARD: Okay.
DEFENDANT:
I don't have any other tools.
MR. HARWARD: Okay.
(R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, pp. 189-192). The trial court,
after this exchange, immediately sentenced Defendant and, in the course of so
doing, imposed restitution in the amount of $882, to which Defendant objected to
in the course of the exchange (See id. at pp. 192 and 191, lines 5-6);
(Italicized and bold emphasis added to show correction).
DATED this 29th day of October, 1998.
WIGGINS, P.C.

Attorney sior Defendant / Appellant
4

CERTIFICATE OF MATTJNG
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ERRATA to the
following, on this 29th day of October, 1998:
Ms. Catherine M. Johnson
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, U;Tg4W-fl854
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court, in light of Defendant's objection

to the imposition, amount, and distribution of restitution, committed
plain error by failing to allow Defendant a full hearing on the issue
of restitution.

The appellate court "will not vacate an order of

restitution unless the trial court abused its discretion or exceeded

its authority."
1997)

State

v.

Westerman,

(citing State v. Robinson,

1993) and State v.
1992)).

945 P. 2d 695, 696 (Utah Ct. App.
860 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah Ct. App.

Twitchell,

832 P.2d

866, 868

(Utah Ct. App.

However, if the trial court's order or restitution is based

on statutory interpretation, the appellate court affords the trial
court's determination no deference and reviews it for correctness.
Id.

(citing Ward v.

In

the

course

restitution,

of

Richfield
the

Defendant

798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990)).x

City,
trial

court's

objected

distribution of restitution

to

the

determination
imposition,

to

impose

amount,

and

(See R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held

December 26, 1997, pp. 190-91 and p. 191, lines 5-6).

Defendant's

appointed trial counsel failed to object to the trial court's failure
to allow Defendant a "full hearing," even though appointed trial
counsel apparently recognized the need for hearing and even though
Defendant

clearly

objected

to

the

imposition,

amount,

and

distribution of the contemplated restitution (See R. 52, Transcript
of Trial Held December 26, 1997, p. 190, lines 7-8).

In the event

that this issue is deemed to have not been raised sufficiently by
virtue of appointed trial counsel's failure to object, this issue,
for the reasons stated below, presents circumstances constituting

x

In the instant case, the trial court apparently determined that
a hearing on Defendant's objections to the imposition of restitution
was not necessary notwithstanding appointed trial counsel's inquiry,
"Do you want to have a hearing, or do we want to it -- I mean." (See
R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1998, p. 190, lines 78) .
5

plain error.
State

See State

v. Archambeau,
2.

v. Dunn,

850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993);

820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);

Whether appointed trial counsel denied Defendant of his

Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel by-

failing to timely object and request that the trial court allow
Defendant a full hearing on the imposition, amount, or distribution
of restitution, thereby denying Defendant of his Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel.
Defendant

must

performance,

show,

falling

first,
below

that

To make such a showing,

counsel

an objective

rendered
standard

a deficient

of reasonable

professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was
prejudicial.

Strickland

v. Washington,

2052, 2064 (1984); see also

State

466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct.

v. Hovater,

914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah

1996).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

in passim

Article I, section 7, Utah Constitution

in passim

The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and
regulations, whose

interpretation

is determinative,

are set

out

verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of
the instant brief.

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By way of Information filed October 20, 1997, Defendant was
charged with theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann.

§

76-6-404.

Defendant

waived

a

preliminary

hearing.

Thereafter, Defendant was arraigned on December 2, 1997, at which
time he pleaded not guilty.

On December 26, 1997, Defendant appeared

before the trial court for a nonjury trial.

Thereafter, the trial

court, without taking the case under advisement, found Defendant
guilty as charged.

The trial court then sentenced Defendant to zero

to five years in the Utah State Prison.

In addition, the trial

court, without hearing, ordered restitution in the amount of $882.00.
Defendant objected to the amount of restitution.
On December 26, 1997, the trial court signed the Judgment and
Commitment to the Utah State Prison, which was entered that same day.
Defendant, through appointed appellate counsel, subsequently filed
Notice of Appeal on January 22, 1998.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The instant appeal arises out a case involving Defendant's

employment with Landscape Express, Inc., and its owner, Mr. Paul
Howard (R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, pp. 9-11).
In fact, Mr. Howard had offered Defendant an ownership position in
the business

and was

in the process

7

of having

the

appropriate

paperwork prepared to effectuate the same (Id.

at R. 52, p. 11, lines

6-18);2
2.

During the course of previously mentioned employment and

imminent ownership in the business, Defendant performed some side
work on a job in Kaysville, Utah (Id.
3.

at R. 52, p. 115, lines 15-17);

Defendant, by way of Information filed October 20, 1997,

was charged with theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-4 04 (Information, R. 1-2). The Information alleged
that Defendant "exercised unauthorized control" over the property of
Landscape Express, Inc., in the course of performing the side work
and failed to reimburse Landscape Express, Inc., for the same
4.
hearing

(Id.);

Defendant subsequently waived his right to a preliminary
(see

Bind-Over Order, R. 8) , after which he pleaded not

guilty to the charge at the arraignment hearing held on December 2,
1997 (Minute Entry Notice, R. 11-12);
5.

On December 26, 1997, Defendant appeared before the trial

court for a nonjury trial (Minute Entry, R. 13) . Upon completion of
the trial, the trial court, without taking the case under advisement,
found Defendant guilty as charged

(Id.

at R. 15-16; Transcript of

Trial, R. 52, p. 188);

2

Contrary to Mr. Howard's assertion, Defendant testified at trial
that the nature of the relationship between Mr. Howard and himself
was that of a partnership (See R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held
December 26, 1997, pp. 108-09) .
8

6.
to

zero

Immediately thereafter, the trial court sentenced Defendant
to

five years

in the Utah

State

Commitment to Utah State Prison, R. 18) .
court, without
$882.00

a hearing, ordered

(Transcript

of

Trial, R.

Prison

and

In addition, the trial

restitution
52, pp.

(Judgment

in the amount of

189-93).

himself, objected to the amount of restitution

(Id.

Defendant,
at R. 52, pp.

190-91);
7.

In the course of the discussion between the trial court and

counsel as well as Defendant about the amount of restitution, the
following exchange took place:
THE COURT:

Well, let me tell you that I would probably
order a restitution in this case, in that
if it wants to be different from that or
argued, I would argue that restitution of
the $1,821 for the three checks, less an
offset for the last payroll check that he's
due. So it would the five hundred -- what
is it, thirty-one?

DEFENDANT:

Seventeen.

THE COURT:

So it would 1,821 minus $517.
be $1,304.

MR. HARWARD:

Yes

MR. ALBRIGHT:

Your honor, the victim here, Paul Howard,
gave an itemized statement to the Court,
and it totaled $1,300. The $600 out of the
$1,821 that you've mentioned was actually
given for topsoil or it went toward
topsoil, was paid off, as I understood.

THE COURT:

Well, my understanding is that he got a
check for that topsoil already.
This is
money that he received from Mrs. Crimins
for this job, went in, and should have been
9

So it would

paid to Landscape Express,
believe that the Court --

I

mean, I

MR. ALBRIGHT:

Do you want to have a hearing, or do we
want to it -- I mean.

MR. HARWARD:

I think that's better the way the Court did
it.

MR. ALBRIGHT:

The $1,821 minus --

MR. HARWARD:

With an offset for the

THE COURT:

Last week's wages.

MR. HARWARD:

And then both parties need to be advised,
this doesn't affect any civil claim one way

THE COURT:

Anything for overtime or any of that stuff
will have to be dealt with separately.

MR. ALBRIGHT:

You can still sue.

DEFENDANT:

Not from incarceration you can't.

MR. ALBRIGHT:

You need to let the Court know if you feel
comfortable -Your order then, would actually be for --

DEFENDANT:

'Cause I it should be -- he should not be
entitled to earn a profit on the side jobs
where I did all the labor myself. If he's
only out thirteen hundred and something
dollars in materials and labor, as you're
claiming, then my $500 should be subtracted
from that and difference should be paid to
him.

MR. ALBRIGHT:

I wonder if we could ask him -•

THE COURT:

Well, if he's willing to accept that, I
mean --

MR. ALBRIGHT:

Why don't we find out from Mr. Howard if
he's willing to accept the -- it would
actually take it down to about $8 0 0 and
10

something, the thirteen that he asked for
minus -THE COURT:

It would be, what, $1,369?

MR. ALBRIGHT:

$1,369.

MR. HARWARD:

In the context of restitution in a criminal
case, he would accept a restitution order
for the amount, the $1,3 00 that he --

THE COURT:

$1,369.

MR. HARWARD:

-- less the --

THE COURT:

$517.

MR. HARWARD:

Yes. However, here's something he's going
-- the tools and things that you're holding
for collateral, he wants to know if he can
get permission,
some way
of getting
recovery the --

DEFENDANT:

I have a $30 trailer hitch, but its locked
in the back of a storage unit, so . . .

MR. HARWARD:

Okay.

DEFENDANT:

I could send
sometime.

MR. ALBRIGHT:

Do you want to add 3 0 onto --

MR. HARWARD:

Can we add that on?

MR. ALBRIGHT:

You keep the hitch.

MR. HARWARD:

Okay.

DEFENDANT:

I don't have any other tools.

MR. HARWARD:

Okay.

If I could -him

a check

for

3 0 bucks

(R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, pp. 189-192).
The trial court, after this exchange, immediately sentenced Defendant
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and, in the course of so doing, imposed restitution in the amount of
$882, to which Defendant objected to in the course of the exchange
(See id.
8.

at pp. 192 and 191, lines 5-6);
On December 26, 1997, the trial court signed the Judgment

and Commitment to the Utah State Prison, which was entered that same
day (R. 18, Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison).

In

the Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison, the trial court
sentenced Defendant to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term of 0-5 years and ordered Defendant to pay restitution in the
(Id.);

amount of $882.00
9.

Defendant,

through

appointed

appellate

counsel,

filed

Notice of Appeal on January 22, 1998 (R. 19-21, Notice of Appeal).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

In light of Defendant's clear objection to the imposition,

amount, and distribution of restitution, the trial court committed
error, both plain and otherwise, by failing to allow defendant a full
hearing on the issue of restitution.
a

By failing to allow Defendant

"full hearing" on his objections with regard to the amount of

restitution,

the

trial

court

denied

Defendant

of

his

right

to

procedural due process;
2.

By failing to timely object to and request a "full hearing"

on the imposition, amount, and distribution of restitution, appointed
trial counsel denied Defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to the

12

effective assistance of counsel.

Appointed trial counsel's failure

to timely object and request a "full hearing" fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment in light of the plain
language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4) (e) .

But for counsel's

deficient performance of failing to object, the outcome or amount of
court-ordered restitution would have been different.

ARGUMENTS
I.

Utah

IN LIGHT OF DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE IMPOSITION,
AMOUNT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF RESTITUTION, THE TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED ERROR, BOTH PLAIN AND OTHERWISE, BY
FAILING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT A FULL HEARING ON THE ISSUE
OF RESTITUTION; THEREBY DENYING DEFENDANT OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
Code

Ann.

§

76-3-201 (4) (e)

provides

that

Mi]f

the

defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full
v.

Haga,

hearing

954 P.2d

on the issue." (Emphasis added).

1284, 1289

(Utah Ct. App. 1998).

See

State

Subsection

(8)(c) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 further requires the trial court
to take into account certain factors in determining the monetary sum
and other conditions for court-ordered restitution.

Id.

The factors to be considered are as follows:
(i)
the financial resources of the
defendant and the burden that payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to the
other obligations of the defendant;

13

at 1288.

(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay
restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the
defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court
determines make restitution inappropriate.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (8) (c) .

Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

201(d)(i) requires that the trial court makes its decisions for
ordering restitution a part of the "court record."
In the instant case, during the court's discussion with counsel
about

the

imposition

of

restitution,

Defendant

objected

to the

imposition, amount, and distribution of restitution by arguing that
Mr. Howard "should not be entitled to earn a profit on the side jobs
where

[Defendant]

did

all

the

labor

[himself]."

(See

R.

52,

Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1998, p. 190, lines 23-25).
Defendant further expressed his objection by asserting he only owed
Mr. Howard "about $500", which Mr. Howard had previously admitted
during a telephone conversation with Defendant. (See id.

at R. 52, p.

191, lines 5-6). However, if this Court determines that the issue or
objection

concerning

the

imposition,

amount, or distribution

is

raised for the first time on appeal, the circumstances surrounding
this issue constitute plain error.

Ordinarily, the failure to raise

a timely objection to matter at trial constitutes waiver of the issue

14

on appeal unless the circumstances surrounding the issue constitute
plain error.
In State
Court

State
v.

outlined

v.

Dunn,
the

Emmett,

839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992).

850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme

following principles

involved

in determining

whether "plain error" exists:
In general, to establish the existence of plain
error and to obtain appellate relief from an
alleged error that was not properly objected to,
the appellant must show the following: (i) An
error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome
for
the
appellant,
or
phrased
differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined.
Id.

at 1208-09; see

also

Ct. App. 1996); and State
1996).

State
v.

According to State

v.

Portillo,

Tenney,
v.

914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah

913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct. App.

Verde,

770 P.2d

116, 121-22

(Utah

1989) , "in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' [found
in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the

'plain error7

standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) . . . ."
The trial court, upon Defendant clearly expressing his objection
to the imposition, amount, and distribution of the

contemplated

restitution, erred, both plainly and otherwise, by failing to allow
Defendant a full hearing on Defendant's objections to restitution.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-201 (4) (e) ; Haga,

15

954 P.2d at 1289;

cf.

Monson

v.

928 P. 2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) .3 Not only did the

Carver,

trial court's failure to allow Defendant a "full hearing" on the
restitution issue deny Defendant of his right to a "full hearing"
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (e) , the trial court's failure also
See

denied Defendant of his constitutional right to due process.
Plumb v.

State,

809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); State v. Rawlings,

P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

892

" x Timely and adequate notice

and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the very heart
of procedural fairness.'"
v.

Jacobsen,

Rawlings,

893 P.2d at 1069 (quoting

Nelson

669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted)).

" X [A]11 parties are entitled to notice that a particular issue is
being considered by a court and to an opportunity to present evidence
and argument on that issue before decision.'"
State,

809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990)).

Id.

(quoting Plumb

v.

"The failure to give adequate

notice and opportunity to participate can constitute a denial of due
process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution."4

Plumb,

809 P.2d at 743.

3

The trial court failed to allow Defendant a full hearing on
Defendant's
objections
to
the
imposition
of
restitution
notwithstanding appointed trial counsel's inquiry, "Do you want to
have a hearing, or do we want to do it -- I mean." (See R. 52,
Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, p. 190, lines 7-8).
4

Article I, section 7, of the Utah State Constitution provides
that " [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."
16

In addition, the trial court, in determining the monetary sum of
the court-ordered

restitution,

failed

to consider

the

factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (8) (c) .
Monson,

928 P.2d 1028.

requisite
See

also

Furthermore, the trial court erred by failing

to make its decisions as to why restitution was appropriate a part of
the "court record." See

id.

With respect to whether the error was harmful, it should be
noted

that

the

evidence

presented

during

trial

was

vague

and

ambiguous as to the amounts allegedly owed by Defendant as a result
of the Crimins side-job.

In fact, evidence was presented at trial

that Landscape Express, Inc., owes Defendant approximately $2,370 in
overtime pay, (see R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997,
p. 114, lines 23-24), and that Defendant submitted copies of payroll
checks as evidence of such (See id.

at R. 52, p. 115, lines 8-14).

The trial court's calculation of the monetary restitution sum for
court-ordered restitution was, in fact, based on the self-serving
testimony and calculation of Mr. Howard (See id.
91).

at R. 52, p. 189-

Consequently, there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the

errors a different result in terms of the amount of restitution would
have occurred.
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II.

BY FAILING TO TIMELY OBJECT TO AND REQUEST A HEARING
ON THE IMPOSITION, AMOUNT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF
RESTITUTION AGAINST DEFENDANT, APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL
DENIED DEFENDANT OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

In Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984),

the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong test for
determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment5 right to effective
Id.

assistance of counsel has been denied.
2 064.

at 687, 104 S.Ct. at

Utah courts adopted this test, which follows: "To prevail, a

defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below
an

objective

standard

of

reasonable

professional

judgment

second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
v.

Deland,

763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); accord

805 P.2d 182, 186

(Utah 1990); State v.

(Utah 1986); State v.
State v. Wright,

Perry,

Frame,

State

v.

and,
Bundy

Templin,

723 P.2d 401, 405

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

" [T]he

right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for
its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused to receive a fair trial."

Lockhart

v. Fretwell,

506 U.S.

364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993).

5

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in
relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
18

In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant must
"xidentify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances,
'show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.'" Templin,

Strickland,

805 P.2d at 186 (quoting

466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)).
A defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional
judgment."
denied,

State v. Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert.

497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).

To

show

prejudice

under

the

second

prong

of

the

test, a

defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceedings would have been different."
at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,

Strickland,

805 P.2d at 187.

466 U.S.

"A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
Strickland,

the outcome."
Parsons
405.
court

v.

Barnes,

466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069;

871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994); Frame,

723 P.2d at

In the process of arriving at this determination, the appellate
"should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into

account

such

factors

as

whether

the

errors

affect

the

entire

evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the
verdict is supported by the record."

Templin,

805 P.2d at 187.

In the instant case, appointed trial counsel's failure to timely
object to the trial court's imposition, amount, and distribution of
19

restitution

fell

below

an

objective

standard

of

reasonable

professional judgment in light of existing Utah case law and the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4) (e) .
201(4) (e) states,

"If

the

defendant

objects

to

Section 76-3-

the

imposition,

amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall

at the

time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue."'
(Emphasis added).
1998)

State

v.

Haga,

954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah Ct. App.

(remanding case to the trial court for required restitution

hearing and "to enter such order thereon as may be appropriate");
Monson

v.

Carver,

928 P.2d

1017, 1029

(Utah 1996)

cf.

(recognizing

requisite "full hearing" on objections to restitution).
Appointed

trial

counsel's

failure

to

timely

object

to and

request the requisite restitution hearing fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment in light of the plain
language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(e), and the aforementioned
Utah case law.6

But for counsel's deficient performance of failing

to object, there would likely have been a different determination as
to the amount of court-ordered restitution.

6

In fact, appointed trial counsel's remarks during the discussion
of restitution after trial indicate that appointed trial counsel was
apparently aware of the need for a full hearing on the restitution
matter (See R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, p.
190, lines 7-8).
20

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this
Court vacate the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court and
remand the case to the trial court to hold a restitution hearing and
enter the appropriate order based on the evidence presented at that
hearing and for further proceedings consistent with this Court's
directions as stated in its opinion.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant and
novel

issues

in

the

instant

appeal

dealing

with

restitution,

ineffective assistance of counsel, and due process, which are matters
of continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of the
instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in the
area of criminal law case development for the benefit of bar and
public.

Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of

disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the

21

Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value
and direction in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

jjfjl d a y of O c t o b e r ,

1998,

Sc WIGGINS, P . C .

AttorneysJfor
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ADDENDUM
Addenda A:

Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison
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Addendum A

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ULC tlu—0 '•i hi Ji—
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff(s),

COMMITMENT TO UTAH^1
STATE PRISONy/K^S__„
Case No. 971701327

vs.
KENT WILLIAM BLANCHARD,
Defendant(s).

Whereas, the above-named defendant, having been convicted or plead guilty- to the
crime(s) of Theft, a felony of the Third degree and now being present in Court accompanied
by his attorney and ready for sentence, thereupon the Court renders it judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: The
defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of 0-5 years.
Court Recommendations: The charge is to run concurrent with present charges.
Restitution is ordered in the amount of $882.00 and a public defender fee is ordered in the
amount of $250.00.
Dated this 26th day of December, 1997, with the Seal of the Court affixed
hereto.
BY THE COURT:
Q<»V^(TV.(T\QA^^
Jon M. Memmott
District Court Judge
PAULA CARR
CLERK OF COURT

$gjuAaU-(nJyrr}\

, ^
*******««"

Laura M. Arbon
Deputy Clerk

